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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000187

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2017 TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP IR AE

SUBJECT: ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE TALKS IRAN CONCERNS WITH

GENERAL MOSELEY

REF: A. ABU DHABI 97 ¶B. ABU DHABI 145

Classified By: Michele Sison, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

11. (S) Summary. Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) Al Nahyan hosted Chief of Staff USAF General T. Michael Moseley on February 1, 2007. MbZ warned Moseley of the growing threat from Iran, stating that they (Iran) "can't be allowed to have a nuclear program." MbZ further emphasized that Iran's nuclear program must be stopped "by all means available." As expected, MbZ inquired about Predator B. Moseley informed MbZ that the question of Predator B would require further discussion within the interagency and with our MTCR partners, while Ambassador noted that the USG looked forward to discussion of UAE defense requirements and our shared security objectives in the context of the Gulf Security Dialogue. MbZ expressed a desire to have a missile defense system in place by Summer 2009, and was looking to add ship-based launch platforms as a part of that system. also noted that the UAE had identified a location on the northern border at an elevation of 6,000 feet that may be suitable for installation of an early warning radar system. End Summary.

Iran

- 12. (S) Stating that "we are living in a dangerous neighborhood," MbZ stressed the importance of curtailing Iran's nuclear program to the overall stability of the Gulf, the Middle East as a region, and to the world's energy markets. Pointing out that a nuclear weapon with even a short-range delivery system puts all the critical infrastructure in the Gulf at risk -- as well as the oil shipping lanes -- MbZ asserted: "If Iran can increase oil production to more than 15 million barrels of oil per day, let them have nuclear power, but until they can replace (the Gulf's) oil production they can't be allowed to have a nuclear program.
- $\underline{\P}3.$ (S) MbZ told Moseley that the US should not focus too much on Ahmadinejad as the problem, but should focus instead on "the greater Iranian threat." Calling Ahmadinejad "merely the driver" of a bus (nuclear program) that has been running for a long time in Iran, MbZ described Iran's nuclear program as one that is no longer driven by personalities — but which has become part of the Iranian identity. Noting that even if Ahmadinejad or other leaders were to change, the nuclear program would still continue, MbZ stated: "Even a siege at this point will not change anything." In answer to Moseley's question what should be done, MbZ responded: "Delay their program -- by all means available." He added: "I am saying this knowing that I am putting my country at risk and placing myself in a dangerous spot.

14. (S) Speaking about his fears of Iran's growing hegemonic aspirations, MbZ warned the US not to underestimate the Iranians characterizing them as "extremely smart." "It amazes me," MbZ continued, "that the Muslim Brotherhood, which controls Hamas, has at its core an opposition to all things Shi'a, and yet they (Hamas) cooperate with Iran. That shows you how smart they are." MbZ then pointed to what he called successful Iranian actions in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Palestine to illustrate how Iran has managed to manipulate Muslim extremism in order to advance Shi'a and Iranian goals.

UAV/Predator B

15. (S) MbZ again asked about the status of the UAE request to acquire Predator B. GeneralMoseley informed MbZ that the question of Predatr B acquisition would require further discussionwithin the interagency and with our MTCR partners. MbZ nodded in understanding: "We are patient." He then added: "I hope the Iranians give us time; they are aggressive and are moving fast." MbZ also mentioned that there were several other countries offering UAVs to the UAE. Ambassador added that the U.S. and the other 33 MTCR members would be meeting in March to review the MTCR control list. Growing demand worldwide for unmanned aerial vehicles had led to the need for a general discussion of how the MTCR controls UAVs and cruise missiles, and the USG looked forward to further discussion of UAE defense requirements and our shared security objectives in the context of the ongoing Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD).

Strategic Interests

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- 16. (S) Moseley's meeting with MbZ immediately followed a Raytheon/Lockheed Martin briefing of MbZ on the ongoing development of THAAD/PAC-3 and shared early warning systems. Speaking of a time frame for the first time, MbZ said he wants a complete missile defense system by summer 2009. MbZ expressed particular interest in the possibility of mounting PAC-3 on Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). Learning that PAC-3 cannot yet be mounted on a seagoing platform, MbZ was pleased to note that SLAMRAAM has already tested successfully on a wide variety of platforms and could be ship-based. Sheikh (Major) Ahmed bin Tahnoon A-Nahyan, advisor to MbZ on critical infrastructure protection, took particular note of this fact and asked about upgrading/extending their existing Hawk/AMRAAM assets. When briefers noted the 32km limit of unelevated radar, MbZ stated that he has a location identified on the UAE's northern border at an elevation of 6000 feet that he would like contractors to come back and look at as a possible location for an early warning radar system. Also present was International Affairs Advisor to the Crown Prince's Court Yousef Al-Otaiba, who is a UAE representative to the GSD.
- 17. (S) Comment: Although MbZ is increasingly talking tough on Iran, i.e., stop Iran "by all means possible" and "deal with Iran sooner rather than later" (ref A), his comments should also be taken in the context of strong UAE interest in acquiring advanced military technology and, specifically, MbZ's repeated requests for Predator B (ref B). The UAEG is clearly nervous about any US actions that could upset their much larger and militarily superior neighbor. The UAE's significant trade relationship with Iran--approximately \$4 billion--is another complicating factor in the relationship. On more than one occasion, the UAE leadership has expressed trepidation over the prospect of being caught in the middle between the US and Iran. End Comment.
- 18. (U) POLAD, Chief of Staff USAF, Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba has approved this message. SISON